China's Involvement in Laos during the Vietnam War, 1963-1975

Known as ‘the secret war’ by the Americans, the conflict in Laos during the 1960s and early 1970s was a vital element in Washington’s containment strategy in Southeast Asia in response to communist violations of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962. Although scholars have studied America’s involvement in Laos, it wasn’t until recently that they have been able to make analysis of China’s involvement. In recent years, scholars have had access to source materials shredding new light of China’s involvement in Laos during the Vietnam War.

In September 1963, there was a secret meeting held between the communist party leaders from China, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), Laos, and Indonesia. The meeting was located at Conghua, near Guangzhou, and was regarding the serious situation created by the Americans in Southeast Asia. Zhou Enlai alleged that the likelihood of direct American interference in Vietnam and Laos was escalating, and that the insurgency in these countries had become a vital front for the struggle against imperialism, feudalism, and capitalism.

Zhou recommended that the leaders devise a three part strategy; “first, expand a united front by winning their people's support; second, build rural revolutionary bases for an armed struggle; and third, enhance the party's strength and leadership. He predicted that as long as the people and leaders had confidence, they could defeat the Americans. Zhou assured the communist leaders present that China would serve as a reliable rear echelon for their revolution and would help them drive the Americans out of Southeast Asia”.

In October 1963, Kaysone Phomviha travelled to Beijing to ask the Chinese for assistance in establishing a revolutionary base for the LPRP. However, Zhou was unsure of the situation in Laos and Kaysone suggested that the Chinese send a mission there to fully understand.

Since the 1930s the North Vietnamese had been a dominant force over the Lao revolutionary movement. “When the Chinese ambassador in Hanoi informed Vietnamese leaders of the new agreement between China and the LPRP, Hanoi's ini-tial response was negative. The DRVs leaders felt that China should con-tinue providing assistance to Laos through Hanoi. Hanoi's leadership, however, agreed to China's direct assistance to the LPRP and its Pathet Lao movement because China was Hanoi's source of substantial assis-tance in the form of arms, ammunition, food, and transportation equip-ment. Negativity by Hanoi's leaders on this issue might compromise their own stated commitment to the national liberation movement in South-east Asia. In their formal reply to Beijing, North Vietnamese leaders praised Beijing's internationalism and generous assistance to their revo-lutionary cause, which they claimed they "should never forget." As for China's aid to Laos, they believed that it would be "equally appreciated and welcomed." Hanoi further stated that China's aid to Laos would be regarded as support to the DRV”. This meant that the Hanoi endorsed the Chinese involvement in Laos.

As the American military became more involved in Southeast Asia, the Chinese adopted a more aggressive strategy in Laos. In the early part of 1964, General Duan and his associates left China and stayed in Laos for five years. The main goals of the Chinese operation in Laos, both military and political, was to “improve the effectiveness of Lao operations, and to determine the types and quantities of Chinese aid”.

The Chinese government did not make military decisions but did follow the military situation in Laos. They were kept informed by the LPLA headquarters and the Vietnamese Advisory Group so that the Chinese could give them advice. Beijing would send them updated intelligence reports every few days and Chinese military officers would often with the LPLA troops to offer assistance and advice.

During the war, the Chinese military supplies totalled 115,000 guns and machine guns, 2,780 artillery pieces, 34 tanks and armoured vehicles, 170 million bullets, 2.67 million shells, 920,000 grenades, 254,000 mines, 2,530 transceivers, 2,654 telephone sets, 773 trucks, 958 tons of explosives, 2.57 million items of military clothing, and 770 tons of food. However, it is uncertain as to whether Laos received them all as the supplies came way via North Vietnam.

Bibliography:

Zhang, Xiaoming (2002) China's Involvement in Laos during the Vietnam War, 1963-1975, The Journal of Military History, Society for Military History.